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Abstract
Cooperation is ubiquitous ranging from multicellular organisms to human societies. Popula-
tion structures indicating individuals’ limited interaction ranges are crucial to understand this
issue. But it is still at large to what extend multiple interactions involving nonlinearity in payoff
play a role on cooperation in structured populations. Here we show a rule, which determines the
emergence and stabilization of cooperation, under multiple discounted, linear, and synergistic
interactions. The rule is validated by simulations in homogenous and heterogenous structured
populations. We find that the more neighbors there are the harder for cooperation to evolve for
multiple interactions with linearity and discounting. For synergistic scenario, however, distinct
from its pairwise counterpart, moderate number of neighbors can be the worst, indicating that
synergistic interactions work with strangers but not with neighbors. Our results suggest that
the combination of different factors which promotes cooperation alone can be worse than that
with every single factor.
1 Introduction
The particulars of why and how cooperation evolves have perplexed evolutionary biologists and
sociologists enduringly [1, 2, 3, 4]. A cooperator takes an altruistic action which supplies a benefit,
b, for another individual at a cost, c, while a defector does nothing. One of the main tasks
of evolutionary theory is to explain how and why cooperation is present. Evolutionary game
theory provides a powerful platform to understand the evolution of cooperation in unstructured
populations, with the replicator equation in infinite populations [3] and stochastic dynamics in
finite populations [5, 6, 7].
Recently the assumption of a well mixed population is removed, and the population allows
individuals to interact locally [8, 9]. Typically networks are adopted to depict such population
structure, since it is simple in definition, while complex in property [8, 10]. The nodes of the
network represent individuals, while the edges denote connections in between [11, 12]. In this way,
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a network paves the way to capture the intrinsic idea of local interaction [13, 14]: Individuals
interact with their neighbors only. In particular, the degree of a node represents the number of
neighbors of the focal individual, which indicates the interaction range. These network structures
are widespread in human organizations [15, 16], scientific collaboration among researchers [17], and
even somatic evolution within multicellular organisms [18]. However, for structured populations, in
contrast with that in the well mixed case [5, 6], it becomes challenging to analyze the evolutionary
dynamics theoretically. This is because enormous possible topological configurations arise during
the process of evolution [19, 20, 21]. In spite of being challenging, there are advances in the
analytical methods [12, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. The main result is that local interactions can pave the
way for the emergence of cooperation.
The conflict between cooperation and defection is captured by the prisoner’s dilemma in the
beginning [2, 27, 28], a pairwise game. Though the “Tragedy of Commons”, a multi-player game,
was introduced to depict this dilemma long before [29], it has not been popular until recently owing
to its complexity [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]. This is also true in structured populations: For
pairwise interactions, conditions for cooperators to be selected over defectors have been theoretically
investigated in general structured populations [12, 22, 24]. For multiple interactions, however, only
two extreme types of network structure with cycle [39] and well mixed populations [34, 35, 36, 40]
have been addressed. For the network degree in between the minimum (the cycle) and the maximum
(well-mixed population), it is unclear under what conditions cooperation outperforms defection.
Besides, we introduce nonlinearity in the public goods, which is intrinsic to the fitness of multi-player
games. For simplicity, the synergistic and discountable effects of the public goods are adopted:
These effects are wide spread in microbes [41, 42, 43]. As a cluster of microbes secretes enzymes
to digest the extracellular resource, the benefit of the secreted enzyme (public goods) provided by
the first cooperative cell may play a vital role for survival, while the enzymes will eventually be
saturated for the resource with the increase of cooperators, thus the cooperator cells joining the
group later only contribute diminishing small benefits to the group [44]. This is the discounting
effect of the public goods. While for synergy, enzyme-mediated reactions will be launched by
enzyme-producing cooperators. With the concentration of enzyme production, this may exhibit a
faster efficiency than linear increase [45]. In addition, the framework of synergy and discounting
effects provides a unifying framework reconciling different social dilemmas [41], thus it does not lose
generality in spite of its simplicity. The main result in the well mixed population is that synergy
is beneficial for the emergence of cooperation while the discounting effect is detrimental.
Considering the importance of both the population structure and the multiple interactions
on the evolution of cooperation, we theoretically explore how the combination of these two effects
affects the emergence and stabilization of cooperation. To this end, we are addressing the stochastic
dynamics of the public goods game with synergy and discounting in a generally random regular
graph with arbitrary degree.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detail description of
the model, and results are given in Section 3. Conclusion and discussion are drawn in Section 4.
Finally, we present all the theoretical derivations in Appendix A to D.
2 Model
We consider a finite population located on a graph of size N . Individuals are assigned to the
nodes of the graph, whereas social ties between them are represented by the edges [11, 12]. Every
individual has k neighbors. As illustrated in Fig. 1, players participate in the public goods game
organized by themselves and their neighbors [46], that is to say, each player participates in k + 1
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Figure 1: (Color online) Illustration of updating on a network. We show a network with size N = 22
and every player has k = 3 neighbors here. Cooperator C11 and defector D12 (D13) are neighbors of
the selected cooperator C1 with updating. Both of C11 and D12 (D13) have neighbors with strategy
of cooperation or defection except C1, which are called C111 and D112, C121 (C131) and D122 (D132),
respectively. C1a1 and D1b2 also have neighbors C1a11, C1b21 adopting strategy of cooperation and
D1a12, D1b22 with defection, where both of a and b mean 1, 2, or 3. Each player organizes a public
goods game with all of its k neighbors. Thus each individual participates in k + 1 public goods
games of size k+1 [46]. As an example, for the payoff of C11, all players marked within the dashed
curve are relevant. The payoff comes from all games C11 participates in, where one game (shaded
in blue) held by C11, that is, part (a), and the other three (shaded in red) held by C1, C111, and
D112, that is, part (b), (c), and (d).
public goods games of size n = k + 1.
For the public goods game, the first cooperator contributes a benefit b while the jth (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
cooperator contributes bδj−1 to the common pool. Every cooperator pays the same cost c. Defectors
exploit the group by reaping benefits without paying anything. The accumulated benefits are
distributed equally to all the n players in the group irrespective of their behaviors. Thus, defectors
and cooperators receive the following payoffs
PD(i) =
b
n
(1 + δ + δ2 + · · ·+ δi−1) =
b
n
1− δi
1− δ
PC(i) = PD(i)− c
(1)
where i is the number of cooperators within the group. Here δ > 0 is regarded as the discounting
(0 < δ < 1) or synergy (δ > 1) factor. As δ = 1, it degenerates to the linear public goods game
with PD(i) = rci/n, where r = b/c is the multiplication factor.
After playing the public goods game, the payoff P of every player is transformed into fitness f
by fitness mapping [5, 47]. Here we adopt the linear fitness which consists of baseline fitness and
the payoffs arising from games [5, 12], i.e., f = 1 − w + wP where w varying from 0 to 1 is the
intensity of selection. For w → 0, the selection is weak. It means that the game is merely one of
many factors which contribute to the entire fitness of an individual [5, 12].
As to the updating rule, the “death-birth” (DB) process [4] is employed. Within the process,
a player in a population is randomly selected to die at each time step, and then all neighbors of
the focused player, with probability proportional to their individual fitness, compete for the vacant
site.
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Figure 2: (Color online) The rule is in good agreement with numerical simulations. The upper
and lower rows show the simulation results of the fixation probability for the random regular graph
with degree k (a, b, and c) and the random graph with average degree k (d, e, and f). Both are
performed for population size N = 400 with weak selection w = 0.01. Fixation probability ρC is
approximated by 106 independent runs. The horizontal dotted line in each figure represents the
fixation probability of a neutral mutant, 1/N . And the arrows point to the theoretical critical value
of b/c favoring cooperation, i.e., ρC > 1/N . The first to third columns correspond to the public
goods game with discounting δ = 0.9, linearity δ = 1.0, and synergy δ = 1.1. We find that the rule
applies to both random regular graphs and random graphs. Note that, as δ is too big or small,
accumulation of the payoff in the common pool is changing rapidly. Any extremely big or small
contribution bδj−1 of any later jth cooperator are fabricated, thus only 0.9 ≤ δ ≤ 1.1 are considered
here. The discrepancy is larger for the random graph (f) with high average degree (k = 10) since
the derivation of the rule is at large N and pair approximation is formulated for the regular graph
without any loops.
We study the emergence of cooperation by comparing the fixation probability [5, 12, 38] of a
single cooperator (ρC) invading a wild population of defective type under weak selection with that
under neutrality 1/N [4]. If ρC > 1/N then natural selection favors cooperator replacing defector
[4], so we see that natural selection favors the emergence of cooperation. We see that natural
selection favors the stabilization of cooperation if ρD < 1/N , that is, natural selection opposes the
fixation of defectors. And if ρC > ρD, we see that natural selection favors cooperator over defector
[4].
3 Results
We obtain the fixation probability of both cooperation and defection by the pair approximation
(see Appendix A and B). For large population size and weak selection, we have a rule: ρC >
1
N if
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Figure 3: (Color online) The critical value of the benefit-to-cost ratio for natural selection favoring
emergence and stabilization of cooperation (defection). We set δ = 0.95 (a) and 1.05 (b) to
represent respectively the weak discounting and synergy in structured populations with N = 5×103
numerically. For discounting effect δ < 1, both the critical values for ρC = 1/N and ρD = 1/N
increase rapidly with average degree k. Yet the critical value for ρD = 1/N is greater than that
of ρC = 1/N , and it also increases much faster. This shows that in the discounting public goods
game, with the increase in the number of neighbors, it is easier for a cooperator to be invasive
(ρC > 1/N) than to be stabilized (ρD < 1/N). For synergy effect δ > 1, the critical value for
ρC = 1/N is greater than that of ρD = 1/N for any neighbor size. This shows that it is easier for
cooperation to be stabilized (ρD < 1/N) than to be invasive (ρC > 1/N). Interestingly, both the
critical values for ρC = 1/N and ρD = 1/N are non-monotonic and is a one-hump function of k.
This shows for both the emergence and the stabilization of cooperation in the public goods game
with weak synergy, a moderate number of neighbors is the worst.
and only if
b/c >


(k+1)2
k+3 for δ = 1
18
3δ2+4δ+3 for k = 2
(N−1)(k+1)Q1
2Nf(δ) otherwise
, (2)
and ρD <
1
N if and only if
b/c >


(k+1)2
k+3 for δ = 1
18
3δ2+4δ+3 for k = 2
(N−1)(k+1)Q1
2Ng(δ) otherwise
(3)
where the notations Q1, f(δ), and g(δ) can be found in Appendix B.4.
For the linear public goods game (δ = 1), natural selection favors not only the emergence of
cooperation but also its stabilization if and only if
b/c > (k + 1)2/(k + 3). (4)
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On this occasion, the rule is equivalent to r > n2/(n + 2) where r is the multiplication factor of
the common pool. Since n2/(n + 2) < n, it implies theoretically that cooperative dilemma can be
relaxed in structured populations compared with that in the well mixed case, without invoking any
other additional mechanisms.
We get ρC > ρD if and only if b/c > 9/5 for linear public goods game on the cycle (k = 2
in our model). And the same result is also found in [39], where, using a direct approach without
approximations, van Veelen et al. pointed that ρC > ρD if and only if b/c > 2n/(4 − 2/n). As
group size n = 3, the linear public goods game on cycle coincides with that in the structured
population with k = 2, and both deduce b/c > 9/5. What’s more is that the general rule to
determine the emergence of cooperation is found to be in good agreement with computer numerical
simulations (see the first row of Fig. 2). And it also approximately applies to heterogeneous
structured populations (see the second row of Fig. 2).
Based on the equation (4), we find that ρC > ρD is also equivalent with the emergence ρC > 1/N
and stabilization ρD < 1/N of cooperation. Furthermore, the following equivalence holds
ρC >
1
N
⇔ ρC > ρD ⇔ ρD <
1
N
(5)
for the public goods game which is either linear δ = 1 or on a cycle k = 2. That is to say, for large
structured population under linear public goods game or public goods game with nonlinearity in
individual payoff on cycle, we have that natural selection favors emergence of cooperation if and
only if it favors stabilization of cooperation. Further, we show that the critical value, both for the
emergence and the stabilization of cooperation, is continuous with the discounting or synergy factor
δ (see Appendix C.1). Hence the equivalent proposition (5) applies for infinitesimal nonlinearity
(see Appendix C.2).
From the rule (see inequalities (2) and (3)), we theoretically get the critical benefit-to-cost ratio
b/c for the emergence and stabilization of cooperation (defection) with the two factors combined,
saying the spatial reciprocity and nonlinearity in payoff induced by multiple interactions. Fig. 3
shows that weak discounting significantly inhibits both the emergence and stabilization of coopera-
tion, whereas the weak synergy favors them greatly. In contrast with the linear public goods game,
the critical ratios b/c for ρC = 1/N and ρD = 1/N are no longer overlapping for nonlinear payoff
effects (see Fig. 3). In other words, taking into account either discounting or synergy, a particular
form of nonlinearity in payoff, the emergence and the stabilization of cooperation are no longer
equivalent as in the linear public goods case (see equivalent proposition (5)).
For multiple interactions such as linear public goods, similar to pairwise interactions [12], coop-
eration will also be impeded with an increase of the number of neighbors (see light gray up triangle
in Fig. 3). Discounting in payoff significantly inhibits cooperation (see Fig. 3a). In particular,
in this case, with the increase in the size of neighbourhood, it will become even harder for the
emergence and stabilization of cooperation. The critical benefit-to-cost ratio is increasing much
rapidly than its linear public goods game counterpart.
For weak synergy, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio b/c for emergence or stabilization of cooper-
ation still first increases as the growth of every player’s number of neighbors (see Fig. 3b). But it
decreases as neighbor size is big enough and tends towards zero. This illustrates that for small size
of neighbor, increasing interaction range, i.e. k, is detrimental for cooperation, which is consistent
with linear public goods game; yet the interesting story comes along when the interaction range is
relatively large, in this case, increasing the interaction range is beneficial for cooperation, which is
seldom observed in cooperative dilemmas. An intuitive understanding can be: for small neighbor
size, the local competition plays a key role. Even though the public goods are exponentially in-
creasing with additional cooperator in a group, the group is small in size generally, thus the defector
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Figure 4: (Color online) Critical value of benefit-to-cost ratio degenerates to a monotonic function
of average degree k from one-hump function with the enhancement of synergy. We set different
synergy factors to investigate its effects on the critical value of b/c with population size N = 5×103.
Specific values of δ are marked on each panel. Orange star and cyan square are used to indicate
ρC = 1/N and ρD = 1/N respectively. The critical value decreases with the increase of δ. And
it is a parabolic function of k when synergy is weak (a, b, c, d, and e), whereas monotonic when
synergy is strong (f). Under the synergistic effect, big k or δ can drive the critical value to approach
0. The intuitive understanding behind this is the competition between the two factors. For large k,
the population is approximately well mixed, thus the local interaction diminishes by the replicator
equation [41], and cooperation with synergy thrives, leading to a decrease of the critical value with
increasing k. For small k, the local interaction plays an important role if the synergy effect is not
strong. That is to say for δ slightly more than the unit, increasing k does inhibit the fixation for
both strategies as in the pairwise Prisoner’s Dilemma [12]. To sum up, for small δ > 1, there is a
hump for the critical value with the increase of neighbors. For large δ, however, even for small k,
the synergy effect is strong enough to outperform the locality of the population structure. By the
same argument, the critical value is monotonically decreasing with the neighbors.
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would reproduce more efficiently with the increase of size. This leads to the increase of the critical
benefit-to-cost ratio. For large size of neighbors, however, the exponential increase in the accu-
mulation of public goods with an additional cooperator outperforms the reproduction of defectors.
For example, with the jth (0 ≤ j ≤ k+1) cooperator’s benefit bδj−1 to common pool, big j induces
large payoff bδj−1/(k + 1) to every player in the same group with weak synergistically enhanced
effect δ as well as the baseline benefit b. This rather large payoff paves the way for emergence
and stabilization of cooperation for large neighbor size. Therefore, it is the worst for emergence of
cooperation when the number of neighbors is moderate. Another intuitive explanation is that for
weak synergy effect, the replicator dynamics allows the coexistence of cooperators and defectors
[41], which is quite similar to the snowdrift game. For the snowdrift game, however, local interac-
tion can inhibit cooperation [48] in contrast with the prisoner’s dilemma [49]. Here, we explicitly
show up to how many numbers would be the worst for cooperation in such scenario. It shows that
synergistic interactions work with strangers in well mixed populations [41]. Furthermore, we also
find that the synergistic interactions do not work with neighbors in structured populations.
For stronger synergy, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio always decreases with the neighbor size
(see Fig. 4). Thus in this case cooperation could be promoted significantly with the increase of every
player’s number of neighbors under strong synergy, which intrinsically differs from effect of linearity,
discounting, or weak synergy. This is because the synergy effect is so great that it effectively is a
coexistence game where best relies should be of the population minority. In this case, enlarging
the interaction range paves the way for cooperator mutants to be more like an minority yielding
an enhancement of cooperation level. Our results strongly suggest that the intrinsic multiple
interactions, where payoffs are nonlinear in general, can cause the so called sea-sickness [50].
4 Conclusion and Discussion
In conclusion, we find a rule theoretically elucidating the critical value of benefit-to-cost ratio b/c
up to which cooperation emerges and is stabilized. In addition numerical simulations verify the
validity of the rule as well as its feasibility for random graph. For linear public goods game on
any regular graph and any public goods game with synergy and discounting on a cycle, we find an
equivalent proposition that the rule determines not only the emergence, but also the stabilization
of cooperation. What’s more, in public goods with synergy, we present that it can be the worst for
the emergence of cooperation, as the number of neighbors is moderate. We find that synergistic
interactions work with strangers but not with neighbors, and cooperation with both synergistic and
local interactions can be worse than that with each alone. Our work suggests that there can be a
big shadow in the effects of combinational mechanisms on the evolution of cooperation.
Over the past two decades, structured populations depicted by networks have been taken into
consideration to study the evolution of cooperation by virtue of evolutionary graph theory[11, 20,
24, 51]. It has been shown that cooperation can flourish in both static network and dynamic
network [8, 12, 20, 25, 51, 52, 53] (for an exception, please see [48]). The main reason is that these
population structures can lead to a clustering of cooperative individuals [8, 12, 21, 24, 54], within
which cooperators can survive by enjoying the benefits from mutual cooperation even though some
cooperators are exploited by defectors along cluster boundaries. We indicate that in a non-additive
public goods game, where nonlinearity in payoff arises, this clustering (see equations (25) and (26)
in Appendix A.2) is not always beneficial when the neighbors are few in number: in a synergy public
goods scenario, where the latter cooperators in the group contribute significantly much more than
the previous cooperators, the worst case for cooperation emerges when the number of neighbors is
moderate, not too big nor too small. This means that synergistic interactions work with strangers
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but not with neighbors. Our results show that the interaction between different mechanisms [55]
might trigger novel unexpected results. The combination of different factors with each promoting
cooperation alone can be worse than every factor alone in promoting cooperation. Thus, it may be
promising to investigate the combination of previous mechanisms promoting cooperation.
We find that the rules governing the emergence and stabilization of cooperation are equivalent
for linear public goods games, which is validated by numerical simulations on homogenous as well
as heterogenous structured populations. The rule simply asks the benefit to cost ratio b/c to exceed
a critical value (k + 1)2/(k + 3), where k is the average number of neighbors in the population. In
fact, for any number of neighbors k, the numerator of the critical value is (k + 1)2, which suggests
the number of individuals relevant to the payoff of the focal individual with recounting (see Fig. 1),
i.e., the product of the group size k + 1 and the average number of the public goods game every
player involved in, k+1. Therefore, in this case, as in a well mixed population, multiple interactions
significantly inhibit the cooperation than its pairwise counterpart. For public goods games on a
cycle, with either linearity, discounting, or synergy. The equivalence still holds between the rules
facilitating the emergence of cooperation and that governing the stabilization. Therefore the same
criterion applies to determine under what condition the average abundance of cooperation exceeds
that of defection in the mutation-selection equilibrium under small mutation [56, 57].
The equivalence falls down for general population structures and nonlinear public goods game.
For the synergy effect, the emergence and the stabilization of cooperation are facilitated significantly
for any number of neighbors compared with the linear public goods game. Being stabilized, in this
case, is much easier than the emergence. For the discounting effect, both the emergence and the
stabilization of cooperation are inhibited significantly for any number of neighbors compared with
the linear public goods game. Being stabilized, in this case, is much harder than the emergence.
Therefore, both synergy and discounting has a more significant role in the stabilization compared
with the emergence.
As applications, for microbes with either synergy and discounting public goods, in particular,
if the public goods are diffusive [58], the average degree of the network suggests the diffusion rate
of the public goods. Our result suggests that for the discounting public goods game, only a low
diffusion rate of public goods can make the cooperator cells thrive; For the synergy public goods
game, however, it is always better than the discounting case. The interesting result lies in the fact
that cooperation is better off for both very low and very high diffusion, whereas is worst off for
moderate diffusion rate. Experimental validation along this line might be interesting.
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A The calculation of fixation probability under the framework of
pair approximation
We adopt the fixation probability to investigate the emergence and stabilization of cooperation,
which has been used by many researchers for finite population [59, 5, 12, 60]. The updating process
and dynamics can be got by pair approximation [12, 61]. And the method to derive fixation
probability of cooperation or defection based on multiple interactions is similar to that based on
pairwise interactions [12].
A.1 Updating process
For the structured population, let X and Y denote the strategy of cooperation or defection. And
pX and pXY are assigned respectively to the frequency of strategy X and XY pairs. qX|Y indicates
the conditional probability of finding a player of strategy X for a player of strategy Y . From the
notations interpreted above, we have
pC + pD = 1,
qC|X + qD|X = 1,
pXY = pY · qX|Y ,
pCD = pDC .
Furthermore, under the framework of pair approximation, we find pC and qC|C are sufficient to
describe the system since
pD = 1− pC ,
qD|C = 1− qC|C , (6)
pCD = pDC = pC · qD|C = pC(1− qC|C), (7)
qC|D =
pCD
pD
=
pC(1− qC|C)
1− pC
, (8)
qD|D = 1− qC|D =
1− 2pC + pCqC|C
1− pC
, (9)
pDD = pDqD|D = 1− 2pC + pCqC|C . (10)
We assume that a selected individual, cooperator C1, who has k neighbors which consist of kC
cooperators (C11) and kD defectors (D12) (see Fig. 1 in main text), is replaced by a defector with
probability Λ under the death-birth (DB) process, thus we have
Λ =
kD(1− w + wpi
C
D)
kC(1− w + wpiCC ) + kD(1− w + wpi
C
D)
=
kD
k
+
kCkD(pi
C
D − pi
C
C )
k2
w +O(w2)
with kC + kD = k, where pi
D
C , pi
D
D mean the payoff of C11, D12 after playing public goods game
respectively, and O(wi) means that the error is of order O(wi), where i is a positive integer.
In order to compute the payoff of an individual after playing public goods games, we should
consider the population structure around the individual. Here, we list the the neighbor and the
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number of cooperators as well as defectors among k neighbors of Xab and her neighbors as
Xab


Xa : 1
{
Ca1 : kC
Da2 and Da3 : kD
Cab1 : (k − 1)qC|X


Xab : 1
Cab11 : (k − 1)qC|C
Dab12 : (k − 1)qD|C
Dab2 : (k − 1)qD|X


Xab : 1
Cab21 : (k − 1)qC|D
Dab22 : (k − 1)qD|D
where X can be C or D, a = 1 or 2, and b = 1, 2, or 3.
Therefore, we know that there are (k− 1)qC|C cooperators (we call them C111), except C1, and
(k − 1)qD|C defectors (we call them D112) among the k neighbors of C11 (see Fig. 1 in main text).
Hence, we have
piCC = PC
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 2
)
+ (k − 1)qC|C · PC
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 2
)
+(k − 1)qD|C · PC
(
(k − 1)qC|D + 1
)
+ PC(kC + 1)
considering population structure around C11. The first term in the right-hand side of the above
equation is the payoff got by C11 from the public goods game centered by itself, and the last three
terms are the sum of the payoffs from the games organized by its neighbors. Similarly, among the
k neighbors of D12 (see Fig. 1 in main text), there are (k− 1)qC|D cooperators (we call them C121),
except C1, and (k − 1)qD|D defectors (we call them D122). Thus we have
piCD = PD
(
(k − 1)qC|D + 1
)
+ (k − 1)qC|D · PD
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 1
)
+(k − 1)qD|D · PD
(
(k − 1)qC|D
)
+ PD(kC + 1)
considering population structure around D12. From the point of pair approximation, we know that
D13 can obtain the same payoff as D12.
If the selected cooperator is replaced by a defector, pC will decreases by
1
N with probability
Pr
(
∆pC = −
1
N
)
= pC
k∑
kC=0
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Cq
kD
D|CΛ.
Simultaneously, as the decrease of pC , the number of CC-pairs is changing. And CC-pairs
will decrease by kC after a defector replacing a cooperator. Hence pCC decreases by
kC
kN/2 with
probability
Pr
(
∆pCC = −
2kC
kN
)
= pC
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Cq
kD
D|CΛ.
If the selected individual is a defector D2, we obtain
piDC = PC
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 1
)
+ PC(kC)
+(k − 1)qC|C · PC
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 2
)
+(k − 1)qD|C · PC
(
(k − 1)qC|D + 1
)
piDD = PD
(
(k − 1)qC|D
)
+ PD(kC)
+(k − 1)qC|D · PD
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 1
)
+(k − 1)qD|D · PD
(
(k − 1)qC|D
)
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where piDC (pi
D
D) indicates the payoff of D2’s neighbor C21 (D22 or D23) who adopts the strategy of
cooperation (defection) after playing public goods games. Thus, D2 is replaced by a cooperator
during the updating process with probability
Γ =
kC(1− w + wpi
D
C )
kC(1− w +wpiDC ) + kD(1− w + wpi
D
D)
.
And, similarly we have
Pr
(
∆pC =
1
N
)
= pD
k∑
kC=0
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Dq
kD
D|DΓ,
and
Pr
(
∆pCC =
2kC
kN
)
= pD
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Dq
kD
D|DΓ.
A.2 Updating dynamics
If we assume every DB updating incident takes place in one unit of time, the derivatives of ˙pC and
p˙CC can be written as
˙pC =
1
N
Pr
(
∆pC =
1
N
)
+
(
−
1
N
)
Pr
(
∆pC = −
1
N
)
, (11)
and
p˙CC =
k∑
kC=0
2kC
kN
Pr
(
∆pCC =
2kC
kN
)
+
k∑
kC=0
(
−
2kC
kN
)
Pr
(
∆pCC = −
2kC
kN
)
. (12)
We have
Pr
(
∆pC =
1
N
)
= pD
k∑
kC=0
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Dq
kD
D|D
kC
k
+pD
k∑
kC=0
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Dq
kD
D|D
kCkD(pi
D
C − pi
D
D)
k2
w +O(w2)
= pD
k∑
kC=1
k!
kC !(k − kC)!
kC
k
qkCC|Dq
k−kC
D|D
+pD(pi
D
C − pi
D
D)w
k∑
kC=0
k!
kC !(k − kC)!
kC(k − kC)
k2
qkCC|Dq
k−kC
D|D +O(w
2)
= pDqC|D
k∑
kC=1
(k − 1)!
(kC − 1)!(k − kC)!
qkC−1C|D q
k−kC
D|D +O(w
2)
+pDqC|DqD|D
k − 1
k
(piDC − pi
D
D)w
k−1∑
kC=1
(k − 2)!
(kC − 1)!(k − kC − 1)!
qkC−1C|D q
k−kC−1
D|D
= pDqC|D + pDqC|DqD|D
k − 1
k
(piDC − pi
D
D)w +O(w
2)
= pCD +
k − 1
k
(piDC − pi
D
D)pCDqD|Dw +O(w
2), (13)
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and
Pr
(
∆pC = −
1
N
)
= pC
k∑
kC=0
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Cq
kD
D|C(1−
kC
k
)
+pC
k∑
kC=0
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Cq
kD
D|C
kCkD(pi
C
D − pi
C
C )
k2
w +O(w2)
= pC − pC
k∑
kC=0
k!
kC !(k − kC)!
kC
k
qkCC|Cq
k−kC
D|C
+pC
k∑
kC=0
k!
kC !(k − kC)!
kC(k − kC)
k2
qkCC|Cq
k−kC
D|C (pi
C
D − pi
C
C )w +O(w
2)
= pC − pCqC|C
k∑
kC=1
(k − 1)!
(kC − 1)!(k − kC)!
qkC−1C|C q
k−kC
D|C +O(w
2)
+pCqC|CqD|C
k − 1
k
(piCD − pi
C
C )w
k−1∑
kC=1
(k − 2)!
(kC − 1)!(k − kC − 1)!
qkC−1C|C q
k−kC−1
D|C
= pC − pCqC|C + pCqC|CqD|C
k − 1
k
(piCD − pi
C
C )w +O(w
2)
= pCD +
k − 1
k
(piCD − pi
C
C )pCDqC|Cw +O(w
2). (14)
Substituting equations (13) and (14) into equation (11), we obtain
˙pC =
1
N
k − 1
k
pCD
[
qD|D(pi
D
C − pi
D
D) + qC|C(pi
C
C − pi
C
D)
]
w +O(w2). (15)
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The first term in the right-hand side of the equation (12) is
k∑
kC=0
2kC
kN
Pr
(
∆pCC =
2kC
kN
)
=
k∑
kC=0
2kC
kN
pD
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Dq
kD
D|D
(
kC
k
+O(w)
)
=
2pD
Nk2
k∑
kC=0
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Dq
kD
D|Dk
2
C +O(w)
=
2pD
Nk2
k∑
kC=1
k2Ck!
kC !(k − kC)!
qkCC|Dq
k−kC
D|D +O(w)
=
2pD
Nk2
k∑
kC=1
qC|D(kC − 1 + 1)k!
(kC − 1)!(k − kC)!
qkC−1C|D q
k−kC
D|D +O(w)
=
2pCD
Nk2
[ k∑
kC=1
(kC − 1)k!
(kC − 1)!(k − kC)!
qkC−1C|D q
k−kC
D|D
+
k∑
kC=1
k(k − 1)!
(kC − 1)!(k − kC)!
qkC−1
C|D
qk−kC
D|D
]
+O(w)
=
2pCD
Nk2

 k∑
kC=2
qC|Dk(k − 1)(k − 2)!
(kC − 2)!(k − kC)!
qkC−2C|D q
k−kC
D|D + k

+O(w)
=
2pCD
Nk2
[
qC|Dk(k − 1) + k
]
+O(w)
=
2pCD
Nk
[
1 + (k − 1)qC|D
]
+O(w),
and the second term is
k∑
kC=0
(
−
2kC
kN
)
Pr
(
∆pCC = −
2kC
kN
)
= −
k∑
kC=0
2kC
kN
pC
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Cq
kD
D|C
(
kD
k
+O(w)
)
= −
2pC
Nk2
k∑
kC=0
(
k
kC
)
qkCC|Cq
kD
D|CkCkD +O(w)
= −
2pC
Nk2
k−1∑
kC=1
k!
kC !(k − kC)!
qkCC|Cq
k−kC
D|C kC(k − kC) +O(w)
= −
2pC
Nk2
k−1∑
kC=1
qC|CqD|Ck(k − 1)(k − 2)!
(kC − 1)!(k − kC − 1)!
qkC−1C|C q
k−kC−1
D|C +O(w)
= −
2(k − 1)
Nk
pCDqC|C +O(w).
Hence, we obtain
p˙CC =
2
Nk
pCD
[
1 + (k − 1)(qC|D − qC|C)
]
+O(w). (16)
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From equations (15) and (16), we have
q˙C|C =
d
dt
(
pCC
pC
)
=
2
Nk
pCD
pC
[
1 + (k − 1)(qC|D − qC|C)
]
+O(w). (17)
The system is described only by pC and qC|C . Rewriting the r.h.s’s of equations (15) and (17)
as functions of pC and qC|C yields the closed dynamic system{
p˙C = wF1
(
pC , qC|C
)
+O(w2)
q˙C|C = F2
(
pC , qC|C
)
+O(w)
(18)
where
F1
(
pC , qC|C
)
=
1
N
k − 1
k
pC(1− qC|C)
[
qC|C(pi
C
C − pi
C
D)
+
1− 2pC + pCqC|C
1− pC
(piDC − pi
D
D)
]
,
F2
(
pC , qC|C
)
=
2
Nk
(1− qC|C)
[
1 + (k − 1)
pC − qC|C
1− pC
]
.
With 0 < w≪ 1, above system can be reduced as{
p˙C = wF1
(
pC , qC|C
)
wq˙C|C = wF2
(
pC , qC|C
) .
For qC|C , whose velocity can be large when w is small and wF2(pC , qC|C) 6= 0, may rapidly converge
to the root defined by F2(pC , qC|C) = 0 as time t→ +∞. Thus we get
qC|C =
k − 2
k − 1
pC +
1
k − 1
(19)
and the reduced (slow) model
p˙C = wF1
(
pC ,
k − 2
k − 1
pC +
1
k − 1
)
.
From equation (19), we know that all variables in the dynamically evolutionary system (18) can
be described only by pC when it is stable. And from equations (6)∼(10), we have
qD|C =
k − 2
k − 1
(1− pC), (20)
pCD = pDC =
k − 2
k − 1
pC(1− pC), (21)
qC|D =
k − 2
k − 1
pC , (22)
qD|D = 1−
k − 2
k − 1
pC , (23)
pDD = (1− pC)
(
1−
k − 2
k − 1
pC
)
. (24)
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Here we obtain
qC|C − qC|D =
1
k − 1
(25)
qD|D − qD|C =
1
k − 1
(26)
as the evolution is stable. That is to say, in finite structured population where every player has k
neighbors, there is a high average probability for cooperators or defectors to form clusters where
every individual with the same strategy. We know that the above equation is irrelevant to the payoff
forms and the existence of nonlinearity in individual fitness. The relation is also proposed in [12]
for pairwise interactions. Hence, it explicitly illustrates the fact of clustering by local interaction
for multiple and pairwise games in finite structured population.
Then, as δ 6= 1, we know
piDC − pi
D
D = PC
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 1
)
+ (k − 1)qC|C · PC
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 2
)
+(k − 1)qD|C · PC
(
(k − 1)qC|D + 1
)
−PD
(
(k − 1)qC|D
)
− (k − 1)qC|D · PD
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 1
)
−(k − 1)qD|D · PD
(
(k − 1)qC|D
)
− c
=
b
(k + 1)(1− δ)
[
1− δ(k−1)qC|C+1 + (k − 1)qC|C − (k − 1)qC|Cδ
(k−1)qC|C+2
+(k − 1)qD|C − (k − 1)qD|Cδ
(k−1)qC|D+1 − 1 + δ(k−1)qC|D − (k − 1)qC|D
+(k − 1)qC|Dδ
(k−1)qC|C+1 − (k − 1)qD|D + (k − 1)qD|Dδ
(k−1)qC|D
]
− (k + 1)c
=
b
(k + 1)(1− δ)
{
− (k − 1)qC|Cδ
(k−1)qC|C+2 +
[
(k − 1)qC|D − 1
]
δ(k−1)qC|C+1
−(k − 1)qD|Cδ
(k−1)qC|D+1 +
[
(k − 1)qD|D + 1
]
δ(k−1)qC|D
}
− (k + 1)c
=
b
(k + 1)(1− δ)
{[
− (k − 2)pC − 1
]
δ(k−2)pC+3 +
[
(k − 2)pC − 1
]
δ(k−2)pC+2
+
[
(k − 2)pC − k + 2
]
δ(k−2)pC+1 +
[
− (k − 2)pC + k
]
δ(k−2)pC
}
− (k + 1)c
=
b
(k + 1)(1− δ)
[
− (k − 2)pCδ
(k−2)pC+3 + (k − 2)pCδ
(k−2)pC+2 + (k − 2)pCδ
(k−2)pC+1
−(k − 2)pCδ
(k−2)pC − δ(k−2)pC+3 − δ(k−2)pC+2 + 2δ(k−2)pC+1 − kδ(k−2)pC+1
+kδ(k−2)pC
]
− (k + 1)c
=
b(k − 2)(δ2 − 1)
k + 1
δ(k−2)pCpC +
b(δ2 + 2δ + k)
k + 1
δ(k−2)pC − (k + 1)c. (27)
Using
piDC − pi
D
D −
(
piCC − pi
C
D
)
= PC
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 1
)
− PC
(
(k − 1)qC|C + 2
)
+PD
(
(k − 1)qC|D + 1
)
− PD
(
(k − 1)qC|D
)
=
b(1− δ2)
k + 1
δ(k−2)pC ,
16
we get
piCC − pi
C
D =
b(k − 2)(δ2 − 1)
k + 1
δ(k−2)pCpC +
b
[
2δ2 + 2δ + k − 1
]
k + 1
δ(k−2)pC − (k + 1)c. (28)
As δ = 1, we obtain
piDC − pi
D
D = pi
C
C − pi
C
D =
b(k + 3)
k + 1
− (k + 1)c.
From above equation, we find both equation (27) and (28) are available as δ = 1.
A.3 Fixation probability
Using Kolmogorov backward equation [59, 60, 62], we get the fixation probability, φC(p) of the
strategy cooperation with initial frequency p, satisfies the ordinary differential equation as
M (pC)
dφC(p)
dp
+
V (pC)
2
d2φC(p)
dp2
= 0,
with boundary conditions
φC(0) = 0 φC(1) = 1
where M (pC) and V (pC) are respectively the mean and the variance of pC , the amount of change
in strategy frequency per generation. The solution of the above differential equation with the
boundary conditions can be written
φC(p) =
∫ p
0 G(x) dx∫ 1
0 G(x) dx
where
G(x) = e
−
∫ 2M(x)
V (x)
dx
.
Now, let’s calculate −2M(x)/V (x). In a short time interval, ∆t, we have
M(pC) =
E[∆pC ]
∆t
=
∆t
N
[
Pr
(
∆pC =
1
N
)
− Pr
(
∆pC = −
1
N
)]
1
∆t
≈
1
N
k − 1
k
pCD
[
qD|D(pi
D
C − pi
D
D) + qC|C(pi
C
C − pi
C
D)
]
w
=
w
N
k − 1
k
k − 2
k − 1
pC(1− pC)
[(
k
k − 1
− qC|C
)
(piDC − pi
D
D) + qC|C(pi
C
C − pi
C
D)
]
=
w(k − 2)pC(1− pC)
Nk(k − 1)
{
k(piDC − pi
D
D) + [(k − 2)pC + 1]
[
(piCC − pi
C
D)− (pi
D
C − pi
D
D)
]}
=
w(k − 2)pC(1− pC)
Nk(k − 1)
{
k
[
b(k − 2)(δ2 − 1)
k + 1
δ(k−2)pCpC +
b(δ2 + 2δ + k)
k + 1
δ(k−2)pC
−(k + 1)c
]
+ [(k − 2)pC + 1]
b(δ2 − 1)δ(k−2)pC
k + 1
}
=
w(k − 2)pC(1− pC)
Nk(k − 1)
{
b(δ2 − 1)(k − 2)δ(k−2)pCpC
+
b
[
(k + 1)δ2 + 2kδ + k2 − 1
]
k + 1
δ(k−2)pC − k(k + 1)c
}
, (29)
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and
V (pC) =
Var[∆pC ]
∆t
=
1
∆t
E
[(
∆pC −
E[∆pC ]
∆t
)2]
∆t
=
[
1
N2
− 2
E[∆pC ]
N∆t
+
(
E[∆pC ]
∆t
)2]
Pr
(
∆pC =
1
N
)
+
[
1
N2
+ 2
E[∆pC ]
N∆t
+
(
E[∆pC ]
∆t
)2]
Pr
(
∆pC = −
1
N
)
≈
1
N2
[
Pr
(
∆pC =
1
N
)
+ Pr
(
∆pC = −
1
N
)]
≈
2pCD
N2
=
2pC(k − 2)(1 − pC)
N2(k − 1)
. (30)
Then we obtain
−
2M(x)
V (x)
= −
Nw
k
{
b(δ2 − 1)(k − 2)δ(k−2)xx
+
b
[
(k + 1)δ2 + 2kδ + k2 − 1
]
k + 1
δ(k−2)x − k(k + 1)c
}
= w
{
−
Nb(δ2 − 1)(k − 2)(k + 1)
k(k + 1)
δ(k−2)xx
−
Nb
[
(k + 1)δ2 + 2kδ + k2 − 1
]
k(k + 1)
δ(k−2)x +N(k + 1)c
}
.
Therefore, we have
−
2M(x)
V (x)
= w
[
Rδ(k−2)xx+ Sδ(k−2)x +N(k + 1)c
]
where
R = −
Nb(δ2 − 1)(k − 2)
k
S = −
Nb
[
(k + 1)δ2 + 2kδ + k2 − 1
]
k(k + 1)
.
A.3.1 Fixation probability for δ = 1
As δ = 1, k ≥ 2, we have
R = 0, S = −
Nb(k + 3)
k + 1
, and−
2M(x)
V (x)
= [S + c(k + 1)N ]w.
Then we get
G(x) = e
∫
[S+c(k+1)N ]wdx ≈
{
1 + [S + c(k + 1)N ]wx
}
C0
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where C0 is a constant. Thus,
φC(p) =
p+ [S + c(k + 1)N ] p
2
2 w
1 + [S + c(k + 1)N ] 12w
≈ p+
[
S + c(k + 1)N
]p2
2
w −
[
S + c(k + 1)N
]p
2
w
= p+
[
S + c(k + 1)N
]w
2
(p2 − p)
= p+
N
2
[
b(k + 3)
k + 1
− c(k + 1)
]
p(1− p)w.
And as δ = 1, k ≥ 2, we also have
φD(p) = p−
N
2
[
b(k + 3)
k + 1
− c(k + 1)
]
p(1− p)w.
A.3.2 Fixation probability for δ 6= 1 and k 6= 2
As δ 6= 1, and k 6= 2, we have∫
−
2M(x)
V (x)
dx =
∫ [
(Rx+ S)δ(k−2)x + c(k + 1)N
]
w dx
= w
[
(Rx+ S)
δ(k−2)x
(k − 2) ln δ
−
∫
R
δ(k−2)x
(k − 2) ln δ
dx+ c(k + 1)Nx+ C2
]
= c(k + 1)Nxw +
δ(k−2)x
(k − 2) ln δ
[
Rx+ S −
R
(k − 2) ln δ
]
w + C3w
where C2 and C3 are constants, and then we obtain
G(x) = e
{
c(k+1)Nx+ δ
(k−2)x
(k−2) ln δ
[
Rx+S− R
(k−2) ln δ
]
+C3
}
w
≈ 1 +
{
c(k + 1)Nx+
δ(k−2)x
(k − 2) ln δ
[
Rx+ S −
R
(k − 2) ln δ
]
+ C3
}
w.
Let A = (k − 2) ln δ, then
∫ p
0
G(x) dx ≈ x
∣∣∣p
0
+
[
c(k + 1)Nx2
2
∣∣∣∣p
0
+
δ(k−2)x
(
Rx+ S − RA
)
A2
∣∣∣∣p
0
−
Rδ(k−2)x
A3
∣∣∣∣p
0
+ C3
∣∣∣∣p
0
]
w
= p+
[
c(k + 1)Np2
2
+
1
A2
δ(k−2)p
(
Rp+ S −
R
A
)
−
1
A2
(
S −
R
A
)
−
Rδ(k−2)p
A3
+
R
A3
+ C3p
]
w
= p+
[
c(k + 1)Np2
2
+
(
R
A2
p+
S
A2
−
2R
A3
)
δ(k−2)p −
(
S
A2
−
2R
A3
)
+ C3p
]
w
and ∫ 1
0
G(x) dx ≈ 1 +
[
c(k + 1)N
2
+
(
R
A2
+
S
A2
−
2R
A3
)
δ(k−2) −
(
S
A2
−
2R
A3
)
+ C3
]
w.
19
Thus, the fixation probability of the strategy cooperation, φC(p), with initial frequency pC(t =
0) = p can be written
φC(p) =
A1 +B1w
C1 +D1w
where
A1 = p B1 =
c(k + 1)Np2
2
+
(
R
A2
p+
S
A2
−
2R
A3
)
δ(k−2)p −
(
S
A2
−
2R
A3
)
+ C3p,
C1 = 1 D1 =
c(k + 1)N
2
+
(
R
A2
+
S
A2
−
2R
A3
)
δ(k−2) −
(
S
A2
−
2R
A3
)
+C3.
Expanding φC(p) in a Taylor series at w = 0, we obtain
φC(p) ≈ p+ (B1 −D1p)w
= p+
[(
c(k + 1)N
2
p+Q
)
(p − 1) +
(
R
A2
p+Q
)
δ(k−2)p −
(
R
A2
+Q
)
pδk−2
]
w
where
Q =
S
A2
−
2R
A3
=
−ANb
[
(k + 1)δ2 + 2kδ + k2 − 1
]
+ 2Nb(δ2 − 1)(k − 2)(k + 1)
A3k(k + 1)
= Nb
2(δ2 − 1)(k − 2)(k + 1)−A
[
(k + 1)δ2 + 2kδ + k2 − 1
]
A3k(k + 1)
= Nb
Q2
Q1
,
R
A2
p+Q = −
pNb(δ2 − 1)(k − 2)(k + 1)
A2k(k + 1)
+
NbQ2
A3k(k + 1)
=
ApNb(1− δ2)(k − 2)(k + 1) +NbQ2
A3k(k + 1)
= Nb
pQ3 +Q2
Q1
,
R
A2
+Q = Nb
Q3 +Q2
Q1
,
and the notations are used as
Q1 = A
3k(k + 1) = k(k + 1)(k − 2)3 ln3 δ,
Q2 = 2(δ
2 − 1)(k − 2)(k + 1)−A
[
(k + 1)δ2 + 2kδ + k2 − 1
]
= 2(δ2 − 1)(k − 2)(k + 1)−
[
(k − 2)(k + 1)δ2 + 2k(k − 2)δ + (k − 2)(k2 − 1)
]
ln δ,
Q3 = A(1− δ
2)(k − 2)(k + 1) = (1− δ2)(k + 1)(k − 2)2 ln δ.
Furthermore we have
φC(p) ≈ p+
{[
c(k + 1)N
2
p+Nb
Q2
Q1
]
(p− 1) +Nb
pQ3 +Q2
Q1
δ(k−2)p −Nb
Q2 +Q3
Q1
pδk−2
}
w
with δ 6= 1, and k 6= 2.
And we also have
φD(p) ≈ p−
{[
c(k + 1)N
2
p+Nb
Q2 +Q3
Q1
δk−2
]
(p − 1)−Nb
(p − 1)Q3 −Q2
Q1
δ(k−2)(1−p) −Nbp
Q2
Q1
}
w
with δ 6= 1, and k 6= 2.
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A.3.3 Fixation probability for k = 2
Using the same method as above, we have
φC(p) ≈ p+
N
2
[
(3δ2 + 4δ + 3)b
6
− 3c
]
p(1− p)w
with k = 2, and
φD(p) ≈ p−
N
2
[
(3δ2 + 4δ + 3)b
6
− 3c
]
p(1− p)w
with k = 2.
A.3.4 Conclusion of the fixation probability for cooperation and defection
By the above tedious calculation, we obtain the fixation probability of strategy cooperation with
initial frequency p as
φC(p) =


p+ N2
[
b(k+3)
k+1 − c(k + 1)
]
p(1− p)w for δ = 1
p+ N2
[
(3δ2+4δ+3)b
6 − 3c
]
p(1− p)w for k = 2
p+
{[
c(k+1)N
2 p+Nb
Q2
Q1
]
(p − 1) +NbpQ3+Q2Q1 δ
(k−2)p −NbQ2+Q3Q1 pδ
k−2
}
w otherwise
.
(31)
And through similarly calculative process, we have the fixation probability of strategy defection
with initial frequency p as
φD(p) =


p− N2
[
b(k+3)
k+1 − c(k + 1)
]
p(1− p)w for δ = 1
p− N2
[
(3δ2+4δ+3)b
6 − 3c
]
p(1− p)w for k = 2
p−
{[
c(k+1)N
2 p+Nb
Q2+Q3
Q1
δk−2
]
(p− 1)−Nb (p−1)Q3−Q2Q1 δ
(k−2)(1−p) −NbpQ2Q1
}
w otherwise
.
(32)
B Criteria for emergence and stabilization of cooperation
As to the criteria for emergence and stabilization of cooperation, we compare (the fixation probabil-
ity with which a cooperator will invade and take over a population of N−1 defectors) and 1/N (the
fixation probability of a neutral mutant [4]). If ρC > 1/N then natural selection favors cooperator
replacing defector [4] , we call that natural selection favors the emergence of cooperation. We call
that natural selection favors the stabilization of cooperation if ρD < 1/N , that is, natural selection
opposes the fixation of defectors. And if ρC > ρD, we call that natural selection favors cooperator
over defector [4] . For mathematical feasibility, we obtain the criteria according to the following
three occasions.
B.1 As δ = 1
For large N and δ = 1, the fixation probability of a single cooperator (defector) in a population of
N − 1 defectors (cooperators) is given by ρC = φC
(
1
N
)
(ρD = φD
(
1
N
)
). That is,
ρC = φC
(
1
N
)
≈
1
N
+
1
2
[
b(k + 3)
k + 1
− c(k + 1)
](
1−
1
N
)
w, (33)
ρD = φD
(
1
N
)
≈
1
N
−
1
2
[
b(k + 3)
k + 1
− c(k + 1)
](
1−
1
N
)
w. (34)
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Hence, we have ρC >
1
N if and only if
b/c >
(k + 1)2
k + 3
, (35)
and ρD <
1
N if and only if
b/c >
(k + 1)2
k + 3
. (36)
B.2 As δ 6= 1 and k 6= 2
For large N , δ 6= 1, and k 6= 2, we have
ρC = φC
(
1
N
)
≈
1
N
+
w
Q1
[
1−N
N
c(k + 1)
2
Q1 + (1−N)bQ2 + (Q3 +NQ2)bδ
k−2
N − (Q3 +Q2)bδ
k−2
]
=
1
N
+
w
Q1
[
1−N
N
c(k + 1)
2
Q1 + bf(δ)
]
where f(δ) = (NQ2 +Q3)δ
k−2
N − (Q2 +Q3)δ
k−2 − (N − 1)Q2.
As 0 < δ < 1, we know that Q1 < 0, then
ρC >
1
N
⇔
w
Q1
[
1−N
N
c(k + 1)
2
Q1 + bf(δ)
]
> 0
⇔
1−N
N
c(k + 1)
2
Q1 + bf(δ) < 0
⇔
bf(δ)
c
<
(N − 1)(k + 1)Q1
2N
.
We have f(δ) = (NQ2+Q3)δ
k−2
N −(Q2+Q3)δ
k−2−(N−1)Q2 < 0 (see Appendix D.1) as 0 < δ < 1.
Thus, we get
ρC >
1
N
⇔ b/c >
(N − 1)(k + 1)Q1
2Nf(δ)
for 0 < δ < 1.
As δ > 1, we know that Q1 > 0, then
ρC >
1
N
⇔
w
Q1
[
1−N
N
c(k + 1)
2
Q1 + bf(δ)
]
> 0
⇔
1−N
N
c(k + 1)
2
Q1 + bf(δ) > 0
⇔
bf(δ)
c
>
(N − 1)(k + 1)Q1
2N
.
We have f(δ) > 0 (see Appendix D.2) as δ > 1. Thus, we get
ρC >
1
N
⇔ b/c >
(N − 1)(k + 1)Q1
2Nf(δ)
for δ > 1.
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So, for large N , δ 6= 1, and k 6= 2, we have ρC >
1
N if and only if
b/c >
(N − 1)(k + 1)Q1
2Nf(δ)
(37)
where f(δ) = (NQ2 +Q3)δ
k−2
N − (Q2 +Q3)δ
k−2 − (N − 1)Q2.
For ρD, we have
ρD = φD
(
1
N
)
≈
1
N
−
w
Q1
{
1−N
N
c(k + 1)
2
Q1 − b(N − 1)(Q2 +Q3)δ
k−2
+b
[
NQ2 + (N − 1)Q3
]
δ
(k−2)(N−1)
N − bQ2
}
=
1
N
−
w
Q1
[
1−N
N
c(k + 1)
2
Q1 + bg(δ)
]
where g(δ) = [NQ2 + (N − 1)Q3] δ
(k−2)(N−1)
N − (N − 1)(Q2 + Q3)δ
k−2 − Q2. We have Q1 < 0,
g(δ) < 0 as 0 < δ < 1, while Q1 > 0, g(δ) > 0 as δ > 1. Thus, using the same method, we also
obtain ρD <
1
N if and only if
b/c >
(N − 1)(k + 1)Q1
2Ng(δ)
(38)
for large N , δ 6= 1, and k 6= 2.
B.3 As k = 2
Using the same method as above, we have ρC >
1
N , ρD <
1
N if and only if
b/c >
18
3δ2 + 4δ + 3
, (39)
and ρD <
1
N if and only if
b/c >
18
3δ2 + 4δ + 3
(40)
for large N and k = 2.
B.4 A rule for the evolution of cooperation
A rule is obtained theoretically for the evolution of cooperation under combination of structured
population and multiple interactions, that is, we have proposition that ρC >
1
N if and only if
b/c >


(k+1)2
k+3 for δ = 1
18
3δ2+4δ+3
for k = 2
(N−1)(k+1)Q1
2Nf(δ) otherwise
, (41)
and ρD <
1
N if and only if
b/c >


(k+1)2
k+3 for δ = 1
18
3δ2+4δ+3
for k = 2
(N−1)(k+1)Q1
2Ng(δ) otherwise
(42)
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from inequalities (35), (37), (39), and (36), (38), (40) for large N , k > 1, and δ > 0, where
f(δ) = (NQ2 +Q3)δ
k−2
N − (Q2 +Q3)δ
k−2 − (N − 1)Q2, (43)
g(δ) =
[
NQ2 + (N − 1)Q3
]
δ
(k−2)(N−1)
N − (N − 1)(Q2 +Q3)δ
k−2 −Q2, (44)
and
Q1 = k(k + 1)(k − 2)
3 ln3 δ,
Q2 = 2(δ
2 − 1)(k − 2)(k + 1)−
[
(k − 2)(k + 1)δ2 + 2k(k − 2)δ + (k − 2)(k2 − 1)
]
ln δ,
Q3 = (1− δ
2)(k + 1)(k − 2)2 ln δ.
For the linear public goods game on the cycle (δ = 1 and k = 2), ρC > ρD is equivalent to
b/c > 9/5, which coincides with [39] theoretically. Through numerical simulations for k > 2 to
check our theoretical results, we find that the rule, ρC > 1/N , is in good agreement with computer
numerical simulations (see Fig. 2).
Furthermore, from the inequalities (41) and (42), we know that as δ 6= 1 and k 6= 2 the conditions
for ρC >
1
N and ρD <
1
N are mainly different in f(δ) and g(δ). Here we expend f(δ) and g(δ) in
Taylor series around δ = 1 to investigate the difference. For each δ in interval (0.9, 1.1), we have
f(δ) =
k(k + 3)(k − 2)3(N − 1)
2N
(δ − 1)3
+
(4− 3k2)(N2 − 3N + 2)− k(19N2 − 3N − 16) + 2k3(N2 − 1)
12N2
(k − 2)3(δ − 1)4
+o((δ − 1)4) (45)
g(δ) =
k(k + 3)(k − 2)3(N − 1)
2N
(δ − 1)3
+
(3k2 − 4)(N2 − 3N + 2)− k(35N2 − 51N + 16) + k3(4N2 − 6N + 2)
12N2
(k − 2)3(δ − 1)4
+o((δ − 1)4) (46)
where o((δ−1)4) captures the error is the higher order infinitesimal of (δ−1)4. Therefore we obtain
f(δ) and g(δ) display the difference in forth order of δ − 1, and it is infinitesimal as δ around 1.
C Theoretical analysis for the critical value of b/c favoring evolu-
tion of cooperation
C.1 Evaluation on continuity for critical value of b/c
We first calculate the limitation of (N−1)(k+1)Q12Nf(δ) and
(N−1)(k+1)Q1
2Ng(δ) at δ = 1 and k 6= 2. Let
lim
δ→1
(N − 1)(k + 1)Q1
2Nf(δ)
=
(N − 1)(k + 1)
2N(L1 + L2)
where
L1 = lim
δ→1
[
Q3
(
δ
k−2
N − δk−2
)/
Q1
]
= lim
δ→1
(1− δ2)(δ
k−2
N − δk−2)
k(k − 2) ln2 δ
= lim
δ→1
−2(δ
k−2
N
+2 − δk) + (1− δ2)
[
k−2
N δ
k−2
N − (k − 2)δk−2
]
2k(k − 2) ln δ
= lim
δ→1
δ
2k(k − 2)
{
− 2
[(
k − 2
N
+ 2
)
δ
k−2
N
+1 − kδk−1
]
− 2δ
[
k − 2
N
δ
k−2
N − (k − 2)δk−2
]
+(1− δ2)
[(
k − 2
N
)2
δ
k−2
N
−1 − (k − 2)2δk−3
]}
=
2
k
(
1−
1
N
)
(47)
and
L2 = lim
δ→1
{
Q2
[(
δ
k−2
N − δk−2
)
+ (N − 1)
(
δ
k−2
N − 1
)]/
Q1
}
= lim
δ→1
L3︷ ︸︸ ︷{
2(δ2 − 1)(k + 1)−
[
(k + 1)δ2 + 2kδ + (k2 − 1)
]
ln δ
} L4︷ ︸︸ ︷[
(δ
k−2
N − δk−2) + (N − 1)(δ
k−2
N − 1)
]
k(k + 1)(k − 2)2 ln3 δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
L5
= lim
δ→1
L′3L4 + L3L
′
4
L′5
(
L3(1) = L4(1) = L5(1) = L
′
5(1) = 0
)
= lim
δ→1
L′′3L4 + 2L
′
3L
′
4 + L3L
′′
4
L′′5
(
L′4(1) = L
′′
5(1) = 0
)
= lim
δ→1
L′′′3 L4 + 3L
′′
3L
′
4 + 3L
′
3L
′′
4 + L3L
′′′
4
L′′′5
(
L′3(1) 6= 0, L
′′
4(1) 6= 0, L
′′′
5 6= 0
)
= lim
δ→1
3L′3L
′′
4
L′′′5
=
3(−k2 + k + 4)(k − 2)2
6k(k + 1)(k − 2)2
(
1
N
− 1
)
=
−k2 + k + 4
2k(k + 1)
(
1
N
− 1
)
(48)
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with
L′3 = 4(k + 1)δ − [2(k + 1)δ + 2k] ln δ −
(k + 1)δ2 + 2kδ + k2 − 1
δ
,
L′4 = (k − 2)(δ
k−2
N
−1 − δk−3),
L′5 =
3k(k + 1)(k − 2)2 ln2 δ
δ
,
L′′4 = (k − 2)
[(
k − 2
N
− 1
)
δ
k−2
N
−2 − (k − 3)δk−4
]
,
L′′5 =
3k(k + 1)(k − 2)2
δ2
(
2 ln δ − ln2 δ
)
,
L′′′5 (1) =
6k(k + 1)(k − 2)2
δ3
.
Therefore we get
lim
δ→1
(N − 1)(k + 1)Q1
2Nf(δ)
=
(k + 1)2
k + 3
. (49)
Using the same method, we also obtain
lim
δ→1
(N − 1)(k + 1)Q1
2Ng(δ)
=
(k + 1)2
k + 3
. (50)
Thus, we find the greatest lower bounds which support ρC > 1/N and ρD < 1/N is continuous
at δ = 1 respectively. Also, we could obtain that the critical value is also continuous at k = 2,
or, k 6= 2 and δ 6= 1. Thus, the critical values in equalities (41) and (42) can be proven as an
continuous function of k and δ for k > 1 as well as δ > 0.
C.2 The equivalent proposition with infinitesimal nonlinearity
For large structured population under linear public goods game or public goods game with nonlin-
earity in individual fitness on cycle, we have that natural selection favors emergence of cooperation
if and only if it favors stabilization of cooperation (see equivalent proposition (5) in main text).
Here, we give the validation of the equivalent proposition for infinitesimal nonlinearity.
Expending the critical values in equalities (41) (indicated by Critical V alue C) and (42) (in-
dicated by Critical V alue D) in Taylor series at δ = 1, we have
Critical V alue C ≈
(k + 1)2
k + 3
−
(1 + k)2
[
(N − 2)(2 + 4k) + (N + 1)(3k2 + k3)
]
3Nk(3 + k)2
(δ − 1)
+
(k + 1)2
36N2k2(3 + k)3
[
16(N − 2)2 + 4(7N2 − 46N + 28)k + 4(7N2
−61N + 1)k2 + 2(53N2 − 41N − 40)k3 + (65N2 + 37N + 5)k4
+6(2N2 + 6N + 1)k5 + (N2 + 5N + 1)k6
]
(δ − 1)2
Critical V alue D ≈
(k + 1)2
k + 3
−
(1 + k)2
[
(N − 2)(−2− 4k) + (2N − 1)(3k2 + k3)
]
3Nk(3 + k)2
(δ − 1)
+
(k + 1)2
36N2k2(3 + k)3
[
16(N − 2)2 + 4(11N2 + 10N − 28)k + 4(−53N2
+59N + 1)k2 + 2(−28N2 + 121N − 40)k3 + (107N2 − 47N + 5)k4
+6(9N2 − 8N + 1)k5 + (7N2 − 7N + 1)k6
]
(δ − 1)2.
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From above two equations, we find that the infinitesimal discounting effects inhibit evolution of
cooperation, and the infinitesimal synergistic effects favor evolution of cooperation mostly for large
population size N comparing linear public goods game.
Besides, for large N , δ → 1, and k ≥ 2, we have ρC >
1
N (ρD <
1
N ) if and only if
b/c >
(k + 1)2
k + 3
. (51)
And for large structured population under public goods game with infinitesimal nonlinearity in
individual fitness, we have
ρC >
1
N
⇔ ρC > ρD ⇔ ρD <
1
N
. (52)
D Proof of the relation between f(δ) and 0
Let
f(δ) = (NQ2 +Q3) δ
k−2
N − (Q2 +Q3) δ
k−2 − (N − 1)Q2
= Q2f1(δ) + f2(δ)
where f1(δ) = δ
k−2
N − δk−2 + (N − 1)
(
δ
k−2
N − 1
)
, and f2(δ) = Q3
(
δ
k−2
N − δk−2
)
.
For Q2, we have
Q2 = 2(δ
2 − 1)(k − 2)(k + 1)−
[
(k − 2)(k + 1)δ2 + 2k(k − 2)δ + (k − 2)(k2 − 1)
]
ln δ
Q′2 =
f3(δ)
δ
(k − 2)
Q′′2 =
[
1− 2 ln δ +
k2 − 2kδ − 1
(k + 1)δ2
]
(k + 1)(k − 2)
Q′′′2 =
2
[
−k2 + kδ(1 − δ) + 1− δ2
]
δ3
(k − 2)
where f3(δ) = (k + 1)
[
(3− 2 ln δ)δ2 − k + 1
]
− 2kδ(ln δ + 1). Besides, Q1, Q2, Q3, and the first to
third derivative of Q2 are all functions of δ with the parameter k.
D.1 The proof of f(δ) < 0 when 0 < δ < 1
For large N , k 6= 2, and 0 < δ < 1, we derive f(δ) < 0 as follows.
(i). As 0 < δ < 1, f2(δ) < 0 since Q3 < 0 and δ
k−2
N − δk−2 > 0.
(ii). f1(δ) = N(δ
k−2
N − 1)+ (1− δk−2). 0 < 1− δk−2 < 1 and δ
k−2
N − 1 < 0 for 0 < δ < 1. Hence,
we have f1(δ) < 0 when N >
1
1−δ
k−2
N
.
(iii). As 0 < δ < 1, Q′′′2 < 0. Q
′′
2(1) = k(k − 1)(k − 2) > 0, thus we have Q
′′
2 > 0 for 0 < δ < 1.
With Q′2(1) = (−k
2+ k+4)(k− 2) < 0, we obtain that Q′2 < 0 for 0 < δ < 1. And with Q2(1) = 0,
we eventually get Q2 > 0 for 0 < δ < 1.
From (i)-(iii), we have f(δ) < 0 as 0 < δ < 1.
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D.2 The proof of f(δ) > 0 when δ > 1
For large N , k 6= 2, and δ > 1, we derive f(δ) > 0 as follows.
(i). As δ > 1, f2(δ) > 0 since Q3 < 0 and δ
k−2
N − δk−2 < 0.
(ii). We have f ′1(δ) = (k − 2)
(
δ
k−2
N
−1 − δk−3
)
< 0 when δ > 1. With f1(1) = 0, we know that
f1(δ) < 0 as δ > 1.
(iii). As 3 ≤ 2 ln δ, i.e., δ ≥ e
3
2 we have Q2 < 0 since Q
′
2 < 0 and Q2(1) = 0.
(iv). Before proving Q2 < 0 for 1 < δ < e
3
2 , let us consider the function h(x) = 3(1+2x)− (3−
2x)e2x first. We want to point out as follows that h(x) > 0 as 0 < x < 3/2.
For h(x), we have
h′(x) = 4e2x(x− 1) + 6
h′′(x) = 4e2x(2x− 1)
Because h′′(x) < 0 as 0 < x < 1/2, and h′′(x) > 0 as x > 1/2. we know that h′(x) reaches
its minimum at x = 1/2 for 0 < x < 3/2. Thus, we obtain h′(x) > 0 for 0 < x < 3/2 since
h′(1/2) = 6− 2e > 0. And then we find h(x) > 0 as 0 < x < 3/2 since h(0) = 0.
Let δ = ex, and then 1 < δ < e
3
2 is equivalent to 0 < x < 32 . Hence, for 0 < x <
3
2 , we have
f3(δ) = (k + 1)
[
(3− 2 ln δ)δ2 − k + 1
]
− 2kδ(ln δ + 1)
= (k + 1)
[
(3− 2x)e2x − k + 1
]
− 2kex(x+ 1)
< (k + 1) [3(1 + 2x)− k + 1]− 2k(1 + x)(x+ 1)
= −2kx2 + (2k + 6)x− k2 + 4 + k
with the inequalities 3(1 + 2x) > (3 − 2x)e2x and ex > 1 + x. The maximum value of f3(δ) is
f3(k) = −k
2 + 32k + 7 +
9
2k for 0 < x <
3
2 . And f3(k) < 0 if k > 3. It is meant to Q2 < 0 with
respect to k > 3 and 1 < δ < e
3
2 since Q′2 < 0 at this occasion.
(v). For k = 3 and 1 < δ < e
3
2 , we have
f ′3(δ) = 16δ(1 − ln δ)− 6 ln δ − 12
f ′′3 (δ) = −16 ln δ −
6
δ
and f ′′3 (δ) < 0. Because f
′
3(1) = 4 > 0 and lim
δ→+∞
f ′3 = −∞, we derive that f3(δ) reaches its
maximum value at δ where f ′3(δ) = 0. Through Matlab, we can get f3(δ) < −0.9. Hence, we obtain
Q2 < 0 as k = 3 and 1 < δ < e
3
2 since Q′2 < 0 at this occasion.
From (iii)-(v), we have Q2 < 0 as δ > 1 and k 6= 2.
Therefore, we have f(δ) > 0 as δ > 1 and k 6= 2 from (i)-(v).
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